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Abstract of
Maritime Homeland Defense Command and Control:
What is the Right Arrangement?
The terrorist attacks of September 11 th proved that American Homeland Defense is inadequate. Many proposals have been offered to solve the Command and Control arrangement for the Maritime portion of Homeland Defense, but each is hampered by organizational prejudices and therefore lack sufficient unity of effort to ensure successful mission accomplishment.
In order to successfully deter terrorism and meet the operational goals of Maritime Homeland Defense, an integrated Command and Control structure must be established. The commander must have access to a fused intelligence picture that incorporates all sources of intelligence. Once the commander is provided this Maritime Domain Awareness, the assets must not only be in place to act on the intelligence, but the commander must have sufficient control over those forces for execution of the Maritime Homeland Defense mission.
"Our nation has been put on notice:
We are not immune to attack. We will take defensive measures to protect Americans." Terrorism presents a much different threat to the nation than any other in our history.
INTRODUCTION
Terrorists can strike anywhere, and without warning. One of the most vulnerable areas for terrorist attack is the American maritime region. Defending the coastline, seaports and maritime industry, without impeding the free commerce vital to our national economic wellbeing, presents a major challenge. The maritime area we must defend is too large for any one organization to tackle alone. The Command and Control (C2) structure in place on 11
September 2001 to coordinate the actions of Maritime HLD organizations has proven to be inadequate. Since September 11 th , numerous federal agencies have made proposals addressing the need for a more realistic C2 structure. In the Maritime HLD arena, the Coast Guard and the Navy have forwarded four proposals. The C2 structure for Maritime HLD cannot operate in isolation. Maritime HLD is an integrated subset of National HLD and as such cannot be separated from the National HLD C2 organization. Therefore, a National Homeland Defense Commander (HLDC) must be named to coordinate all Department of Defense (DOD) efforts in HLD. Under the HLDC, an overarching C2 structure is required to ensure unity of effort by all agencies involved in Maritime HLD. The commander must have a fused picture of the entire maritime region which can be communicated to all forces involved. Additionally, forces under this commander must work from a common operational plan and be sufficiently empowered to act according to that plan. Under such a structure, there needs to be an integrated, interagency task force responsible for a fused intelligence picture (Maritime Domain Awareness) and coordination of all forces involved in Maritime HLD.
FACTOR TIME, SPACE AND FORCE
For Maritime HLD, the commander will be responsible for defending the entire structure must be flexible, and fast enough to react to both of these potential scenarios.
DEFINING COMMAND AND CONTROL
Command and Control is possibly the most important of all operational functions. C2
is the umbrella under which all other operational functions occur. By establishing who is in charge of the operation, the relationship between organizations in support of the operation can be defined and the span of control of the commander can be determined. 5 A C2 structure must be designed to achieve unity of effort. The most effective way to achieve unity of effort is through unity of command. 6 In the multi-agency arena of Maritime HLD, establishing unity of command is unlikely due to the large number of agencies involved, but the C2 arrangement devised should strive toward unity of command to the maximum extent practicable. Ultimately, the C2 structure must employ all forces and assets in order to meet all operational goals.
In order to meet operational goals, they first must be articulated. Not all operational goals are equal. In Maritime HLD, the first two goals are most important.
Ultimately, if the C2 structure is unable to avoid catastrophic losses, the mission has failed.
The ability to achieve the remaining operational goals hinges on the success in achieving Maritime Domain Awareness. Without the complete, fused intelligence picture, the commander loses the battle of time and is unable to properly deploy forces to avoid catastrophic losses. The chosen C2 structure must be able to achieve these goals in order to be effective.
The C2 structure adopted for Maritime HLD must satisfy three basic tenets. First, it must be able to adequately control the vast area involved in HLD with appropriate assets to prevent terrorist attacks. Second, it must ensure that the assets from all federal, state and local agencies are united in their Maritime HLD efforts (ensure unity of effort). Finally, the commander must be able to accomplish the stated operational goals with the organization established. A C2 structure that does not satisfy all three of these requirements is unacceptable.
HOMELAND DEFENSE BEFORE SEPTEMBER 11 TH
At the height of the Cold War, the Navy and the Coast Guard developed a plan for maritime defense called Maritime Defense Zones (MDZ). Under this plan, the Coast Guard would be placed under the Department of the Navy (DON) in the event of a large scale conflict with the Soviet Union and the existing Coast Guard command structure would transition to command of the MDZ (see Figure 1) . 8 This structure supported the Coast Guard's responsibility for port security and port safety under Federal Law (14 USC 2).
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Under the MDZ plan, the Coast Guard would assume all maritime defense functions in home waters, while the Navy fought the "away game" against the massed Soviet Fleet. MDZ planners envisioned a conventional military force as the threat and as such, Navy and Coast
Guard training and organizational structures were designed to counter such a force. In the aftermath of the September 11 th attacks, the MDZ was the first C2 organization put forward for Maritime HLD. The basic plans were in place and the C2 structure already existed. However, Command (PACOM). That transfer of forces would need to be requested via the Commandant of the Coast Guard, who in turn would make the request for forces from DOD.
DOD would then order PACOM to transfer the required forces to the MDZ Commander, provided those forces were not tasked elsewhere. That arrangement sounds complex, and in fact it is. Each of the area CINCs has competing priorities for force deployment which would result in a severe reduction in unity of effort.
Another impediment to the MDZ plan is that it failed to address the use of nonmilitary assets in the integrated defense of the American maritime region. Since the MDZ was designed for Cold War military defense, the requirement to integrate state and local agencies into the planned C2 structure was not as critical as in the war on terrorism. The failure to integrate all instruments of power severely compounds the handicapping of unity of effort in HLD.
In summary, the MDZ concept was vital for the Cold War, but it does not adequately address the changes in threat, nor the interagency cooperation required for the "War on
Terrorism." Additionally, without unity of command, the MDZ concept suffers a severe handicap in unity of effort. With the "off the shelf" C2 structure proven inadequate, the search is on for a new organization that can adequately address all of the operational factors of time, space and forces involved in Maritime HLD. Since September 11 th , three competing C2 proposals have surfaced to replace the MDZ concept in defending the American maritime region against terrorists.
C2 PROPOSALS POST SEPTEMBER 11TH
Homeland Security-Maritime
The Homeland Security-Maritime (HLS-M) concept has been presented as a new, compromise command arrangement since the attacks of September 11 th . The command HLS-M depends on a layered defense of the coast (see Figure 3 ) to provide security.
The layered defense concept is not new, but is taken directly from Naval Coastal Warfare (Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 3-10 (REV A)), where it was designed for defense of DOD critical ports of embarkation. 16 The current challenge is expanding these concepts to all ports and coastal areas. Since the focus is no longer protecting the integrity of the deploying sealift convoy, but preventing both discrete and wide spread terrorist acts from incoming shipping and domestic sources, the assets required to perform these functions do not exist. The HLS-M concept relies on a flexible response based on three Maritime Security Conditions (MARSEC). 18 The intent of the MARSEC sequence is to address the need to expanded role of Naval Coastal Warfare to defend the entire American maritime region. As the threat increases, MARSEC conditions are increased, focusing assets in the region of the threat. Focusing assets directly serves the operational goal of risked based analysis, spreading assets to deter non-specific threats and concentrating assets on specific threats when those threats appear. Since MARSECs allow force employment across a wide There are problems with the MARSECs as currently defined. The Coast Guard is using the term "New Normalcy" to describe the post-September 11 th routine operating conditions of MARSEC One.
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Unfortunately, the Coast Guard has had difficulty articulating the details of the New Normalcy. The result is a confusion of mission priorities.
The Coast Guard is sacrificing other missions in the name of HLD, especially the counternarcotics and fisheries protection mission, 20 and none of these sacrifices have significantly increased the effectiveness of HLD. Additionally, the proponents of HLS-M have difficulty defining the triggering mechanism for setting the various MARSECs and the corresponding additional forces required. Also of concern is the manner in which forces are shifted to react to increasing MAREC levels. While in MARSEC One, forces are spread over the entire maritime region. Increasing threat levels would bring those assets closer and closer to the perceived threat until MARSEC Three is reached and the large majority of available assets are focused in one location. This shifting of resources would leave the rest of the system undefended. In this manner, when faced with a coordinated attack against multiple targets, HLS-M fails to meet the number one operational goal of avoiding catastrophic losses.
There are three other significant and recognized gaps in the HLS-M concept. First is the lack of unity of effort. By retaining its position in the DOT, the Coast Guard depends on the same series of agreements and understandings to get support from DOD forces that hampered the castigated MDZ concept detailed above. All the commands involved recognize the importance of defending the ports, but competing priorities make coordination of assets, especially Navy assets, extremely difficult. Under the HLS-M structure, the best the Coast Guard could hope for is support from other national intelligence assets. The Maritime Domain Awareness picture must be completely integrated for this scheme of operation to work.
So looking at HLS-M with regard to the aforementioned criteria for a C2 structure, HLS-M falls short in several respects. First, the MARSEC concept leaves vast expanses of the maritime region exposed to attack as the threat is increased and assets are focused onto a specific port or region. Next, unity of effort is severely hampered since the commander will depend on a large force contribution from other agencies without a formalized organization for coordinating these forces. And lastly, without that formalized interagency organization, HLS-M fails to maximize coordination of intelligence assets to achieve the best possible
Maritime Domain Awareness and therefore fails to meet the operational goals of Maritime HLD.
Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC)
The Navy's response to HLS-M is to create a Joint Forces Maritime Component Force for Civil Support (JTF-CS) that is designed to coordinate military participation in the response to terrorist attacks inside the U.S., but JTF-CS is not set up to coordinate the agencies that bring assets to bear for the HLD. 29 Before the JFMCC concept is adopted, the HLDC must be named, the transfer of forces to defend the west coast to the HLDC must be resolved and a system must be established to coordinate the efforts of non-military agencies in Maritime HLD.
Another significant hindrance to the JFMCC concept is Posse Comitatus (18 USC 1385), a law dating back to 1878, preventing the use of federal troops for law enforcement.
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The prohibition against DOD forces from performing law enforcement functions severely impacts the ability of the JFMCC to perform the lower echelon functions required of HLD such as port security. A significant tool in preventing terrorism is routine, but unpredictable, and Navy proposals failing to address all the requirements for a satisfactory C2 structure, an organization developed to answer another complex C2 arrangement offers another potential solution to Maritime HLD C2.
Regional Interagency Task Force Model
The "War on Drugs" has been waged for decades using a complex C2 structure to orchestrate the actions, information and assets of a wide variety of government organizations. The JIATF model has been expanded to the Regional Interagency Task Force (RIATF) (see Figure 4) to account for the greatly increased space and force involved in HLD.
The RIATF provides a significant advantage over the other models, specifically providing the commander with a synthesized, all source, picture of Maritime Domain Awareness.
From this increased Maritime Domain Awareness, the commander should be able to better place assets to counter threats as they arise. The RIATF model still falls short in some of the other aspects required for effective C2. Although the RIATF is the only model that provides for a formalized coordination of the various federal, state and local agencies essential to Maritime HLD, the RIATF commander would not have direct OPCON over all assets required to execute HLD missions. RIATF would still depend on numerous supporting commands and agencies to accomplish the interception and execution aspects of the HLD mission. A minor drawback to the RIATF model is that RIATF is very manpower intensive, thereby compromising the operational goal of economy of force. Additionally, like all of the models presented to date, whether the RIATF will be able to achieve the number one operational goal, avoid catastrophic losses, remains to be seen.
The RIATF organization best institutionalizes unity of effort by incorporating the involved agencies into a common structure. This is the best way to ensure the flow of 
RECOMMENDATIONS
The right C2 structure for Maritime HLD is an integrated structure encompassing both fusion of intelligence in the form of Maritime Domain Awareness and the ability to respond to that intelligence with forces under direct control of the commander. Figure 5 shows the manner in which that synthesis can be achieved. 26 The Captain of the Port is a unique position. The COTP is responsible for the safe, efficient operation of the port under their charge including coordinating the actions of the various port authorities and law enforcement agencies with jurisdiction in the port. Additionally, they are responsible for controlling vessels entering and departing the port, ensuring all vessels comply with US Maritime regulations and coordinating inspections of vessels for Marine Safety. The COTP is also responsible for coordinating incident response within the port to include: environmental protection (i.e. oil spills), marine accidents, natural disasters (hurricanes, earthquakes effecting port facilities) and the results of terrorist attacks. Obviously the COTP is a busy person and shackling the COTP with DoD restrictions could potentially inhibit his ability to perform all of these functions without severely reducing the pace of operations in the port. 32 The President has used his limited authority, during declared emergencies to direct the military to apprehend and detain Non-US citizens suspected of terrorism or supporting terrorist activity, but that Military Order, signed by the President 13 November 2001, is aimed primarily at persons captured in military operations outside the US in order to try them as part of a military tribunal vice the civil court system. This order is limited to non-citizens apprehended outside the United States, but does not extent to operations in the United States. "Defense Officials Close to Naming New Homeland Security Command", Inside the Pentagon (Washington, DC, 06 December 2001).
